In the days before Egyptians went to the polls for the
second round run off of the first freely contested presidential ballots, the People’s
Assembly or parliament was dissolved and the authority for the legislation of
new laws was assumed by the then ruling military Junta, known as SCAF. Some
Egyptians felt more comfortable voting for the Muslim Brotherhood candidate
Mohamed Morsi, knowing that his authority as head of the executive branch would
be limited.
While the parliamentary elections were generally seen to be
free, their rules, most definitely were not.
SCAF had imposed a strange and highly unusual set of rules designed to
tilt the elections towards the two organized forces in the country; the
Islamists and the party of the former president Mubarak, the National
Democratic Party. The election rules were designed to make it very expensive
for any candidate who is not part of an established large national organization
to win. A strange mix of district level proportional representation and quota
for laborers resulted in very larger districts, coupled with runoffs for those
receiving less than 50% of the vote and a system of staggered ballots over a
six week period allowing national organizations to campaign in different
regions around the country sequentially. Dissolving such a gerrymandered
parliament was indeed a good thing, its composition failed to be even remotely representative of the people of Egypt, as could be
seen from the sheer size of the ensuing protests.
The coup process started shortly after the election of
President Morsi, when he decreed the return of the dissolved parliament, the
courts opposed him and he could not impose his will. Few weeks later, the first
part of the coup took place; Morsi kicked SCAF out of the legislative role, a
move that was widely welcomed by most Egyptians who believed Morsi and wanted to give him a chance, his approval rating was close to 70%. Few voices warned of the
concentration of the executive and legislative powers, but Morsi reassured the nation, by
promising that he would, only, make minimal use of his newly acquired
legislative powers.
Two additional bodies were yet to be dissolved by the slow
courts of Egypt, the so called Shura Council or upper house of the parliament,
whose election was made by identical rules to those of the dissolved
parliament, but with less than 7% of Egyptians actually bothering to cast a
ballot, as it had no defined duties or powers at the time of its election. The
second body that was also threatened by the courts was the Constituent
Assembly, whose membership was based on that of the dissolved parliament. The
likelihood of dissolving these two bodies was very high indeed. President Morsi allowed his
supporters to lay siege to the Egyptian Supreme Court and its members were
unable to enter the court, let alone hold any sessions for nearly a month. A strange way for a democracy
to function!
The siege of the court could not continue indefinitely; fearing the eventual rulings by the Supreme Court, President Morsi moved to perfect his coup, he unilaterally assumed super judicial powers
in addition to the legislative powers he had assumed in August. In late November Morsi declared
both the Constituent Assembly and Shura Council immune from dissolution by the
courts, and he assigned full legislative powers to the Shura Council, which he
was yet to name some additional ninety appointed members and he also declared
these decisions to be immune from future legal challenge.
At this point it became clear to many Egyptians that the
elected president has engineered and executed an unprecedented coup. This was Egypt’s big coup, a theft of the
January 25, 2011 revolution that was most certainly not Islamist, by the
Islamists. It was, at that time, that the seeds of the Egypt’s second revolution
were sown by no other than the acts of President Morsi himself. President Morsi was eventually deposed,
following the massive demonstration of June 30, 2013 by millions of Egyptians
against him and his Muslim Brotherhood.
Considerable debate has taken place on the legal
justification of deposing Morsi, was this a military coup or not? Clear as day,
it was military coup, but it was carried out at the will of the vast majority
of Egyptians who wanted Morsi out because of his own coup against legitimacy
and democracy.
AA
July 6, 2013
1 comment:
As I agree with most of your excellent analysis, I still do not agree that the last movement by the army was a coup. The army did not initiate its action. It responded to the will of the millions who took to the streets. Morsi refused any sort of compromise. The army officers did not assume any powers. They were just instrumental to appointba temporary administration.
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