Egypt .. Need three of four to win!

My simple thesis on Egypt ... There are basically four primary forces in the country and these forces represent collectively a minority within Egypt as a whole, with the remainder being the very poor, the apathetic or leave me alone majority. 

1. The Army, all powerful, has basically two main goals, preserve the peace with Israel and preserve its economic privileges, it Doesn't really want more than this.

2. The Mubarak regime supporters. Basically people who supported and / or benefited from Mubarak economic policies and support an authoritarian state focused on economic growth. 

3. The Islamists. People who ultimately wish for a Caliphate but are willing to settle for lesser options, essentially desire an eventual integration between the  state and Islam on all facets.

4. The Revolutionaries. Many differing varieties united in opposing torture, being pro freedom of expression and democracy. Few believe in total equality between ALL citizens and almost all are anti corruption, 

My simple thesis is that whenever three of these forces cooperated stability was possible and progress was made. Anytime only two of the four dominated the scene extreme volitality ensued. This has been the case since the end of the first phase of Egypt's January 25, 2011 Revolution.  

Three years on, Egypt and the world need to learn this!

AA

January 25, 2014

Was The Massacre At Rabaa A Surprise?

Was the massacre at Rabaa a surprise? Could the outcome  have been different?

Short answer is no!

This conclusion results from a basic understanding of the fundamental structure of Egyptian Police and the Egyptian Ministry of Interior (MOI).  A structure that was designed to protect the state from the citizens rather than protecting the citizens as its core mandate. Following are some thoughts I have on the topic

1. Use of conscripts: The vast majority of the the central security “soldiers” are conscripts. I was once told that at conscription intake times, all university graduates automatically get assigned into the army, then  the remainders are asked, who is literate and who is illiterate and the ones who can’t answer the question are the ones that taken for Central Security. I am not trying to mock them, but simply state that it is often, the poorest, least educated, and probably least intellectually capable are the ones that do wind up at the MOI and its Central Security apparatus.

2. Training of soldiers and indeed officers at Egyptian militaristic institution is all based on compliance and the use of humiliation to gain this compliance. The recruits are frequently beaten, imprisoned, tortured  to ensure their compliance. The compliance could be over cleaning an officer’s car, shining his shoes or picking his groceries, could even be for their staff officers who are often the nastiest. 

3. Egyptian police structure is fully like that of an army, national structure, four year college officers, including extensive study of law accompanied by beating and abuse of those who don’t comply with instructions, not exactly the best of times, to let topics like human rights sink in. Officers graduate and move up the ranks, Captain, Colonel, Brigadiers, all the way to Generals. Most leave traditional policing, for extended periods, to engage in other functions within the MOI: ID cards, car registrations, drivers license,  permits, prisons and countless other administrative tasks that make up the huge MOI Empire. A police general may be some twenty years removed from any traditional policing work. Contrast this with simple city based policing, where police officers receive qualify within 6 to 12 months and remain fully focused on policing in their own communities, with this huge cadre of police officers and hundred of thousands of illiterate police foot soldiers.

4. Egypt MOI and Policing in Egypt operates on a national level, so an officer from Alexandria is assigned to Aswan, then Mansoura then Port Said etc. and is almost never allowed to work within his own immediate community in actual policing work. A throw back to the days of the colonialists, when the British and French Administrations rotated their people lest they went native on them and became too attached to the communities they were there to control. This also offers the MOI a tool of reward and punishment, so an officer from Cairo who may take human rights a bit too seriously gets despatched to the Gaza border until he cools down.

The above factors and doubtless, many others are what lead me to conclude that, until fully re-engineered from the grounds up, it will be hard to expect different results from the MOI than what we have witnessed over the last few years. If the protest is armed, partially armed or even lightly armed as the Muslim Brotherhood defendants claim Rabaa was, then the blood letting would indeed be worse. We should not forget that hundreds of protesters died in the early days of Jan25 revolution and, there was no dispute that, those were indeed peaceful unarmed protestors.

Until the Police and MOI structures are fundamentally altered to resemble that of a modern police force, expect more mass needless killings, more torture and more brutality. Sadly President Morsi had the mandate to do just that; to reform the MOI, but he failed to get serious reform even on the agenda. Indeed Morsi praised the role of the police during Jan25 and pursued a policy of appeasement and coaptation with the MOI. 

AA

August 23, 2013

Morsi's Confessions

I could only think of Captain Louis Renault, of the French Vichy controlled Morocco, saying "Round up the usual suspects" as to what, could have possibly, inspired President Morsi ideas of what "the rule of law" as a concept, stood for. Usually, I find myself a consumer of news and analysis during eventful periods, holding back on much writing until news reports slow down. Only then, do I feel, that I can look back at events, with a level of objectivity and clarity. This has become a tall order, with Egypt revolution and post revolution phases, as events never seem to cease. Egypt, where nothing much happened for decades, has gone to the extreme in news generation and endless ensuing commentaries, professional and voluntary journalism alike, the ultimate happening place!

A fascinating aspect of the post Jan25, or the January 25, 2011 Egyptian Revolution, is that, the huge amount of news reports, live news feeds often render radically differing versions of reality. A particular event that occurred on December 5, 2012, commonly referred to as the "Events of Ittahadiya Palace"' where massive clashes between pro and anti President Morsi protesters erupted leaving some 8 people dead and hundreds injured. What is clear is that peaceful anti Morsi protesters were violently attacked by Muslim Brothers, destroying their tents and other belongings. Few have argued that the events started with violence from Muslim Brotherhood supporters against the peaceful encamped protesters. What transpired afterwords, with scenes of urban civil war including use of tear gas, Molotov cocktails and live ammunition is subject to two radically different accounts; how many people were shot dead? Whose side they belonged to? Which side was armed with guns? These questions have conflicting answers. There also appear to be little doubt that the Brotherhood supporters operated some sort of detention center with clear evidence of torture, of their prisoners. I have not seen reports of a similar detention or torture by the anti Morsi protesters. So much has been written on the events of Ittahadiya Palace and staggering amounts of evidence has been assembled. 

Perhaps, for me, most shocking and troubling were the words of President Morsi commenting on Ittahadiya Palace events. The president stated that "hired thugs" were part of the protests, some "80 people have been arrested" and "we have their confessions". President Morsi was speaking of events that occurred merely 24 hours earlier, when he referenced incriminating confessions and conspiracies.

The word "confession" or admission of one's guilt is remarkable coming from a man, who himself, has been on the receiving end of injustice and suppression of freedom of thought and association.  There is little doubt that President Morsi came across numerous stories of the use of coerced confessions as a tool of the totalitarian police state, which Egypt actually revolted against. The fact that he referred to incriminating confessions, of people arrested only few hours earlier, to say the least, was outrageous. 

Totalitarian regimes are highly effective in extracting confessions. They rarely have unsolved crimes, or long running investigations, a criminal is easily found, a confession is forthcoming and thus, the machinery of injustice operate speedily and efficiently. In the case of President Morsi's alleged confessions, the machine did not cooperate. Indeed all 49 people arrested by the Egyptian Police, were in actual fact victims of the Muslim Brotherhood torture, who were released by the prosecutors within two days following President Morsi's remarks.  

Confessions have a relatively weak standing in most democracies and indeed, in some countries, are hardly admitted as evidence except in narrowly defined circumstances. President Morsi's words were, in fact, an indictment, not only to the president himself, but also to his capacity to reform Egypt justice and police systems, one of the clear undertakings of his campaign and post election speeches. Regardless of what President Morsi was told and what information he may not have had access to, how could Egypt first elected post revolution president utter such words. Morsi's words, even if if prosecutors would have cooperated in indicting the victims, betray a total ignorance of the rule of law and the most basic understanding of justice be it civil or Islamic. 

Sadly, the Muslim Brothers and their Freedom and Justice Party played up the Captain Renault understanding of the "rule of law", in practically every single statement or position they have taken, since the Ittahadiya Palace events and upped President Morsi's comments. The Brotherhood never repudiated the original act of destruction of the tents of the anti Morsi protesters, never admitted to the illegal torture and detention by their supporters of the opposition and never accepted the culpability of the Islamists in the death of opposition protesters.

Jan25 revolution, was specifically held on Egypt's Police Day. The 25th of January was chosen Egypt's Police Day in honor of the bravery of an Egyptian police station battling a unit of the the British Army during the struggle for independence. A trigger for Jan25 was the brutal torture and death of a young activist, Khaled Said, at the hands of Egypt's police. The police fabricated drug charges against Khaled Said, with the complicity of the prosecutor and the coroner. Later reexamination of the case proved the guilt and complicity of Egypt's Ministry of Interior. So for President Morsi and the Muslim Brothers to fail to address reform of the police is serious enough, but to engage in the language of "hired thugs" and talk of confessions of conspiracy is simply treacherous to the basic principles of Jan25.  

The following extracts of statement published by  Human Rights Watch and by UNHCR summarizes what many, the world over, are waiting on President Morsi to explain his "confessions":

"A speech by Morsy on December 6 in which he referred to “confessions” of detained protesters as evidence that they were “hired thugs” raises concerns for their due process rights and suggests that the authorities were aware of the illegal detentions outside the presidential palace. The secretary of the president on foreign affairs, Eng. Khaled Al Qazzaz, told Human Rights Watch that the president was not aware of the detention of the 49 individuals at the time and that this was currently being investigated along with reported deaths and injuries.

“Instead of condemning illegal detentions and abuse right outside the presidential palace, President Morsy spoke out against the victims,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “The prosecutor’s response in this high-profile case, namely his willingness to investigate violence by both sides and the role of state officials, is crucial for upholding the rule of law during this tense time."

AA

December 25, 2012

1984 on the Mediterranean - Book Review of In the Country of Men by Hesham Matter

I heard about this book from an interview of Terry Gross on NPR's Fresh Air with the author Hisham Mater. In the interview Mater talked of his own life experience as a boy watching interrogations on Libyan TV and the eventual detention of his father and the exile of the family first to Egypt then England. The author came across as a very thoughtful and articulate, his description of his experience as a child coming so close to the horrors of torture clearly left its mark on him.

In the Country of Men, belongs to the semi fiction genre, it is based on real events witnessed first hand by the author but clearly the author let his very creative talents take over and weave a number of other interesting patterns on the same basic setting of Libyan social and political life in the Seventies.

Hot Mediterranean summer days, lots of white sand and the beautiful blue Mediterranean, a nine year only child living with a mother suffering from depression and alcoholism trying to make the most of a bad marriage. A father, who is somewhat remote and a bit caricature like is a businessman turned activist obsessed with making Libya a better place. Libya is very much right out of 1984 with much of the horrors, brain washing and denials and a great "Guide" too.

Mater's developed his own child character and that of his mother's superbly into complete multi dimensional human beings. The cruelty and contradictions in the child were masterfully portrayed. Also his sense of place and time is remarkable, Mater makes you virtually taste the beautiful delicious mulberries or sense the heat burning your feet from walking in the hot afternoons to the Tripoli beach.

The disappointing parts of the book were just two aspects; the limited development of the character of the father who was clearly central to the story. While it may have been Mater's intention to paint a picture from the eyes of a 9 year old and as a result a sketchy picture of the father may have been appropriate, this somehow jarred with me as the narrative was that of a more mature adult reflecting back on childhood days. This maturity came across in many ways but fell short when discussing the father. The second disappointing aspect of the book was the relationship with Karim, the childhood friend. Mater was brilliant in the way he dealt with the Karim relationship throughout the book but somehow appear to have felt compelled to tidy things up for a semi happy ending.

The interview with Terry Gross, revealed the true experience of Mater's life and the real life ending was far worse than the one he offered. Perhaps this would explain Mater's need to retain a distance from his father, even in a work of semi fiction and the relatively rushed ending of the book.

I strongly recommend this book as another beautifully written work in English with a strong Arab Mediterranean sensibility.

Informed and Perceptive View of Iraq - Book Review of Night Draws Near by Anthony Shadid

This is easily the best book I can recommend to anyone on the Iraq war. Anthony Shadid, a third generation Arab American, who speaks fluent Arabic was on the ground before the Iraq war and lived through its phases all the way to the full blown insurgency.

Shadid demonstrates an excellent understanding of the people and the culture, this understanding makes his analysis very valuable indeed. A very important point that Shadid makes is the desire of the people for justice over democracy.

Shadid's understanding of Iraqi society makes his analysis on the insurgency, its roots and its nature very convincing. The analysis of the power structure with the Shiite religious leadership and the diverging loyalties as well as the Iranian versus Arab orientation of the leadership is very well explained. It is remarkable how ill informed much of the media in the US referring to the Mahdi Army, the Sader militia, as Iranian influenced when Shadid explains clearly their roots being as populist & nationalist counter movement to the Iranian dominated Shiite religion leadership.

Through countless daily interactions with Iraqis from all classes, all sects and all political views Shedid offers tremendous insight on the factors that shaped the views of the Iraqis and how these changed over time as the country sunk deeper into a depressing war. Shedid equally well covered the American troops, their perception of their role and of the Iraqis around them.

Can't say enough about this book except I wish it becomes mandatory reading for political and military readers. Shadid's Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of the war is very well deserved!